19 March 2025
Introduction
The promotion event was organized on 19.3. 2025 as a lecture to an international selection of students from EU and Southern Mediterranean countries. The lecture was held on the occasion of the visit of the President of the Republic of Slovenia and the President of Portugal to the Euro-Mediterranean University, Piran, Slovenia.
The introductory lecture, which presented a discussion on the method of decision-making in the EU and the pressures to introduce qualified majority voting (QMV) also in the areas of common foreign and security policy (CFSP), was followed by a student discussion. The discussion mainly emphasized issues related to EU policy related to studying abroad (the recognition of diplomas and credits in the EU) and also the EU as an international entity in the conditions of a heightened geopolitical situation.
The lecture specifically raised the questions that are listed below.
A strong push in the EU to strengthen QMV in the CFSP
There is a strong push in the EU to strengthen QMV in the CFSP in order to improve decision-making efficiency in geopolitical challenges. Even the Conference on the Future of Europe claims that shifting to QMV would prevent MS from blocking collective action, particularly in response to crises. It will also facilitate stronger measures against MS that violate EU principles (rule of law, freedom of press…).
Arguments pro QMV and the reasons to abandon MS consensus (agreement among all MS) is enhanced decision-making efficiency and higher speed of response (to make EU decisions more swiftly, is crucial during crises). The current security and geopolitical situation require rapid reactions, to geopolitical challenges (not possible by unanimous decision-making and the veto right of the MS).
Arguments against QMV are in the fact that QMV faces challenges related to concerns over EU cohesion, unity and sense of democracy and in national sovereignty and MS resistance. Abandoning consensus is challenging, as it is the fundamental democratic design of the EU; EU basic value is that it is an association of equal and sovereign states.
Key questions
The following questions were discussed:
- Is the fear that sovereignty of small MS is threatened by QMV in CFSP, justified?
- How to ensure safeguards to smaller MS to protect their vital national interests, to alleviate concerns about losing influence (tensions within the EU) and not to feel marginalized or overruled by larger MS – coalitions?
- Do we need additional sovereignty safety net (in addition to EB, CA) enabling smaller MS to retain some level of control, over QMV decisions, impacting their national policies?
Key findings presented
Key findings are:
-The additional transition to QMV might worsen political tensions within the EU. MS could find themselves in conflicts more frequently.
-Unanimity fosters unity among MS, is viewed as a significant internal democratic strength. Abandoning unanimity could weaken the EU’s external credibility and internal coherence.
-Broadening of QMV does not guarantee, nor encourage MS to negotiate and find common ground, it could even lead to a more fragmented CFSP that could undermine the EU’s collective stance on global issues.
-Even if veto is not frequently utilized, its presence encourages MS to engage in discussions that lead to compromises, reducing the deadlocks.
Treaty of European Union (TEU), without amendments, allows for the implementation of the QMV in CFSP! The CFSP is defined and implemented by the European Council (EC) acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The legal framework for QMV in CFSP exists in:
-Constructive abstention, CA; MS are allowed to be excepted from implementing a decision (Art. 31/1),
-Emergency brake, EB, – the right to oppose QMV, as exception to the of Article 31/2,
The Passarelle clause – EC right to enact QMV, by, consensus (Art 31/3 TEU),
-The principle of sincere co-operation (Art 4/3 TEU) applied at CA and EB. the TEU.
Some conclusions presented
QMV decision-making process might be faster and shorter, but at the same time offers: less ground for seeking of positive compromises lower willingness and motivation to reach a compromise (negative indirect effect of QMV). QMV does not really contribute to the EU’s ability to manage conflicts between MS. QMV is not a magic wand that will suddenly make EU decision-making more efficient.
The power of large countries to outvote small ones will not contribute to more cohesion, internal democracy, tolerant dialogue, and quality decision-making. Considering the interests of all nations, regardless of size, is one of the democratic values in the EU’s founding treaties. The TEU already now, if it is well interpreted, contain safety mechanisms (EB, CA, SC, Passarelle) to ensure that no MS could be dictated to on issues vital to its national interests if QMV were to be used in CFSP.
An enlargement policy that is full of delays in one period, hasty in the next period, does not inspire the necessary credibility. For example, North Macedonia waited 16 years (BiH 7 years) to achieve candidate status, Montenegro has been negotiating since 2012, Serbia since 2014, not to mention Turkey (more than 20 years). In the case of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, EC needed only 4 months to complete its assessment.
Justifying enlargement should be balanced by fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, emphasizing geopolitical necessity. In order to maintain its legitimacy, as it is one of the conditions for public support in the MS. Only predictable and credible EU enlargement policy would signal to candidate countries that their aspirations for membership are taken seriously and could accelerate their integration into EU structures.
The video of the lecture is published at:
