10 July 2025, University of Regensburg
1. Conceptual Background: Is There a “Constitution” of the EU?
The lecture began with a foundational inquiry: Does the European Union have a con-stitution? The presenter explained that this question, although seemingly straightfor-ward, remains conceptually complex. The EU is often described as having a “constitu-tional framework,” but not a codified constitution in the classical sense. It is not a state, yet it performs functions and exercises powers often associated with state-like author-ity. The speaker clarified that the EU’s constitutional nature is highly peculiar. The pre-senter argued that while the EU is “functionally constitutional,” its nature as a “polity sui generis” resists traditional categorization.
2. Seven Peculiarities of the EU Constitutional Structure
The core of the lecture was structured around seven key peculiarities that distinguish the EU’s constitutional setup from classical national constitutions.
a. Origin and Evolution
The EU originated as an international organization and has transformed over time into a sui generis polity with many state-like features. Its constitutional development has been evolutionary.
b. Directional Integration
The EU Treaties contain an inherent “directionality,” most clearly expressed in the com-mitment to “an ever-closer union.” This normative orientation lacks precise operational clarity and has become increasingly contested among Member States.
c. Precarious Legitimation Balance
The EU lacks a strong European public sphere and suffers from a composite and indi-rect system of democratic legitimation. This raises concerns about the legitimacy of central EU institutions and their growing influence on national policymaking.
d. Sediments of Intergovernmentalism
Despite supranational features, the EU remains structurally shaped by intergovern-mental constraints. The Treaties preserve veto rights, reverse bicameralism, and a high degree of entrenchment.
e. A Polity without a Purse or Sword
The EU lacks core attributes of statehood, such as an autonomous budget, fiscal au-thority, and a centralized executive or military force. Its dependence on Member States for resources limits its capacity to act decisively.
f. Territorial Openness
In the EU, both accession and secession are comparably easy possible. This openness enhances geopolitical relevance but also introduces structural instability.
g. Variable Geometry
The EU operates with multiple layers of integration (e.g., Schengen, Eurozone, asso-ciation agreements), leading to a Europe of (at least) two speeds. This complicates the internal coherence of its constitutional identity.
3. Reform Proposals
In the second part of the lecture, the presenters discussed current reform proposals that were submitted by a non-governmental Franco-German expert group in Septem-ber 2023 in the light of further enlargement.
a. Institutional Reforms
· European Parliament: Reform ideas include harmonizing electoral laws across Member States and capping the number of Members at 751 with a new system of seat allocation.
· Council of the EU: Proposals advocate replacing unanimity with qualified ma-jority voting (QMV) in most policy fields and enhancing legislative equality be-tween the Council and Parliament, excluding the CFSP.
· European Commission: Two options were discussed: reducing the size of the Commission or introducing a hierarchical structure. A political agreement be-tween Council and Parliament regarding the appointment of the Commission President was also proposed.
b. Competences and Powers
· Reformers suggest clarifying the division of competences rather than drastically rewriting them.
· Improved treaty provisions on crisis management (in health, finance, climate) are urgently needed.
· A new “Joint Chamber of the Highest Courts” was introduced as an idea to in-stitutionalize judicial dialogue between national and EU-level courts.
c. EU Resources
· Reform suggestions include raising the EU budget and introducing new own resources.
· Joint debt issuance and the application of QMV for budgetary decisions are also discussed as potential game changers.
d. Rule of Law Mechanisms
Strengthening Article 7 TEU and extending the scope of the Conditionality Regulation are seen as crucial steps in safeguarding the EU’s core values in times of democratic backsliding.
e. Implementation Strategy
The implementation of these reforms might necessitate a “Multi-Speed Europe” ap-proach, allowing more ambitious Member States to move ahead without waiting for unanimous consensus.
4. Concluding Reflections
In their concluding remarks, Dr. Beyrich and Prof. Graser critically revisited the two guiding questions posed in the final slide of the presentation:
Do the proposed reforms address the EU’s institutional peculiarities?
Does the EU’s current structure limit how far and in which direction reforms can realis-tically go?
The speakers emphasized that while many of the reform proposals discussed inci-dentally touch upon core structural peculiarities of the EU, they were not necessarily designed with those peculiarities in mind. The current momentum for reform is largely driven by practical concerns about the Union’s capacity to integrate new Member States rather than by a systematic reflection on its constitutional identity.
Nonetheless, the reform agenda tends to lean in a clear direction: toward further su-pranational integration, greater institutional coherence, and a reduction of intergovern-mental veto positions. In this sense, the proposals align with a longstanding vision of the EU as a more unified and powerful political actor.
However, Dr. Beyrich and Prof. Graser expressed strong doubts about the political feasibility of implementing such reforms in the current climate. Deep divisions among Member States, persistent sovereignty sensitivities, and the extremely high threshold for treaty change make far-reaching reforms unlikely in the near term. They also ques-tioned whether pushing for deeper integration might come at too high a cost – poten-tially undermining the EU’s fragile consensus and risking internal fragmentation.
In a deliberately sobering note, the speakers suggested that the very constraints which make reform so difficult might not be an inherent failure of the EU model, but rather an expression of its core geopolitical function: preserving peace and stability on the Euro-pean continent. They warned against overburdening the EU with expectations that it may not be institutionally designed to fulfill. A more powerful, centralized Union might not only be politically unrealistic – it could also risk implosion under the weight of inter-nal dissent and unresolved structural asymmetries.
Rather than interpreting the EU’s constitutional peculiarities as mere shortcomings, the presenters proposed to view them as features of a system that has proven remarkably resilient. Its deliberate ambiguity and institutional hybridity allow for a flexible balance between unity and diversity – arguably, a prerequisite for long-term survival in a frag-mented geopolitical landscape.
5. Summary
The lecture offered a balanced and well-structured overview of the EU’s unique con-stitutional features and the reform discourse surrounding its future. It emphasized the need to critically engage with the foundational assumptions about what a “constitution” means in a supranational context and proposed a range of institutional, legal, and fi-nancial innovations that might better equip the Union for current and future challenges.
The discussion was deeply relevant not only to EU scholars and practitioners, but also to participants from outside the Union, offering comparative perspectives and insights into the global significance of the European integration model.
